Previous studies document the reversal in the initial returns of REIT IPOs from overpricing in the 1980s to underpricing in the 1990s. Simultaneously, the gross spreads of REIT IPOs decrease significantly in the 1990s. We attribute the conversion of the spreads and initial returns of REIT IPOs to REIT structure change. Our study concludes that the major factors affecting the spreads are IPO size, expenses, management type, and advisor type while those affecting the initial returns are the valuation uncertainty, IPO size, the underwriters' reputation, and management type. We also observe that the spreads for REIT IPOs are clustering at 6.5% and 7.0% in particular. Underwriters tend to set spreads at 6.5% or 7.0% directly in REIT IPOs that have high valuation uncertainty.
Introduction
The real estate investment trusts (REITs) have evolved rapidly during the 1990s after their initiation in 1960. The revolution includes not only in market recognition but also in management strategy and industry structure change. In general, recent REITs are larger in size, internally advised, actively managed, and invested by more institutional shareholders. The most important is that more real estate companies (1997) show that equity REIT IPOs in the 1990s have been underpriced, on average by 3.6%. The rational for this reversal has been documented in their study. However, we argue that the overpricing or underpricing shows only one side of the cost of going public. The other cost component of REIT IPOs, i.e. underwriting fees, has not been studied so far. How does the underwriter charge REITs within these two periods is intriguing. Chen and Ritter (2000) show the underwriting fees are quite invariant and 90% of medium size IPOs in the United States has been charged exactly 7% fees for industry firms. However, how much do the investment banks charge for REIT IPOs? Do they charge exactly the same 7% or do they charge different percentage based on REITs size, real estate type, market recognition, or their familiarities about REITs?
We argue that for a new product line, underwriters have to learn before setting a regular spread. Therefore, for REITs we may not be able to observe the same underwriting fees as found for industry firms prior to 1990s when REIT industry starts to boom. Because at that time, REITs are not poplar investment targets and investment banks and investors are not familiar with REITs. We expect that underwriters may set up higher fees for earlier REITs IPOs than recent IPOs to protect themselves from asymmetric information.
The unique reversal in the initial returns of REIT IPOs from overpricing to underpricing and the change of underwriters' attitude towards spread setting raise an interesting issue about the total costs of REIT IPOs. For the past two decades, we observe that the average REIT underwriting spread from 1980 to 1989 is 7.19%, which is significantly higher than 6.65% in the 1990s. In addition, more than 30% and 20% of the REIT IPOs have spreads of exact 7.0% and 6.5%, respectively. In particular, spreads of exact 6.5% occur only after 1990.
In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Tax Reform Act to relax the limitations on management type and sponsorship of REITs. After that, REITs are permitted not only to own, but also to manage, most types of income-producing commercial 5 properties. The deregulation changed the management structure and led to the creation of vertically integrated companies that altered the passive nature of REITs. On the other hand, the Umbrella Partnership REIT (UPREIT) was also launched in the 1990s.
This structure allows real estate developers and other real estate owners to transfer their properties to the REIT form of ownership, without any immediate taxation implications. This modern REIT structure induces real estate owners to release their assets to the public, and therefore, bridges the gap between the private and the public real estate market. For institutional investors, the 1993 tax reform allows their REIT investments to bypass the 5/50 rule restriction.
Those changes mentioned above resulted in massive equity market growth in REIT, from US$7.6 billion in 1985 to US$161.9 billion in 2002. The boom in the market may lead to more competition among underwriters, who, therefore, may be forced to lower the spreads and to compensate for their losses by underpricing.
Moreover, the active and internalized management not only has increased the cash flow and dividends, but also affect the uncertainty in pricing REITs. Whether the management type influence the pricing uncertainty and therefore affect the underwriters' spread remain unknown. The internalized management and advisor decrease agency costs by resolving conflicts between external management and shareholders (Capozza and Seguin (2000)). Consequently, the underwriter may charge lower spread because of reduced agency costs. On the other hand, active management may increase pricing uncertainty and underwriters may try to compensate uninformed traders and thus lower the offering prices (see Rock (1986) ).
Chen and Mohan (2002) argue that there are two kinds of relationship, namely, substitutes or complements, between spreads and the initial returns. The similar reversals of underpricing and spread in REIT IPOs before and after 1990 provide a laboratory to examine the relationship between these two cost components paid by issuing firms. In addition, the determinants of the explicit and implicit costs of REIT IPOs are investigated.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and explains the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. We observe the reversal of overpricing to underpricing on REIT IPOs and suspect that the underwriting fees may behave differently from what have been found for industry firms. We hypothesize that with new products on the market, the investment banks need time to adjust their valuation process and risk assessment technology. Accordingly, the underwriting fees and underpricing level of a new instrument should vary at the beginning and adjust to the equilibrium over time.
Literature and Hypothesis
Different from previous research examining underwriting spreads across all industries, we focus on one single industry. This will allow us to further investigate the fee setting strategy of underwriters without considering the industry effect. Due to the passive and defensive characteristics of REITs, investment banks may not expect price spreads to be high enough to compensate their risk associated with asymmetric information, consequently, underwriters may not want to compete on the writing fees.
They will charge the spread based on the offering size and their experiences about real estate market. Therefore, we hypothesize that the clustering of 7% underwriting spread may not be present for REITs. We use the OLS regression model to investigate the determinants of underwriter spread an initial day return. Table 1 shows The underwriting fees then began to decrease to less than 7% when REITs become more popular in the 1990s. The equally-weight spread in the 1980s and 1990s are 7.19% and 6.65% respectively.
Empirical Results

Sample description
Next, we summarize the equally-weighted and value-weighted spreads and initial returns based on management and advisor type, REIT structure, and underwriters' reputation in Table 2 . Panel A shows that in the 1990s REITs with external advisors have to pay higher underwriting fees but lower initial day returns compared with those of the internally advised REITs. However, the situation is reversed during 1987 to 1990 period. We attribute this phenomenon to the new structure-internal advisor that just came to effect after the 1986 Tax Reform observations into "middle-reputation" with a rank of five to seven, and the others are regarded as "low-reputation" with a rank below five. We observe that in the 1990s, REITs pay lower underwriting spread and leave less money on the table when they hired more prestigious underwriters. The total cost is around 10.47% when underwriters' CM ranking is between 7 to 9. Table 3 shows the differences in the spreads and the initial day return for Equity, Mortgage, and Hybrid REITs. Of which, the Hybrid REITs are charged with the highest spread, Mortgage REITs the second, and Equity REITs the third. We argue that because Hybrid REITs are involved in both equity and mortgage operations, they are relatively more uncertain to evaluate than Equity REITs and Mortgage REITs.
Consequently underwriters will ask for higher spreads. The equity and mortgage REITs are significantly different in terms of their initial returns. The average initial return for equity REITs is 3.2% that is higher than 0.63% of the mortgage REITs. We attribute the difference in underpricing to the level of asymmetric information.
Compared to Equity REITs, information about Mortgage REITs is more transparent and the cash flows are more certain. Accordingly, in order to elicit uninformed investors, underwriters lower offering price. Though they charge less fees, they cold be compensated by price spread instead. Table 3 illustrates the average spreads and initial returns by nine property types. The self-storage, lodging/resorts and mortgage-backed securities have the top three equally-weighted mean spreads, but their amounts of gross proceeds are all below US$110 million. On the contrary, the spread of the industrial/office is at its lowest level against the highest proceeds. Therefore, in addition to property type, economies of scale may also have influence on spreads. On the other hand, the industrial/office is significantly underpriced, with the average initial return of 6.15%.
Panel B of
Again, we observe that underwriters charge lower spread, but leave more money on the table. 
OLS regression
The determinants of gross spreads are presented in Table 5 . From Table 5 , we find that the amount of proceeds is significantly related to the gross spread. The higher the offering size, the lower the spread is charged. For underwriter's reputation, it is not associated with gross spreads. The positive and significant relationship between spread and REIT index indicates that underwriters will analyze the industry risk (proxy by the standard deviation of NAREIT index return) as reference for setting up the fees. The other two significant variables are management type and advisor type.
We argue that for self-managed and internally advised REITs, underwriters face less risk due to more inside information than otherwise, and therefore charge lower underwriting fees. The shareholdings of top five institutional investors and insiders have no impact on the spreads. By the insignificance of the year dummy variable, we conclude that there is no major difference between two sub-periods. For UPREITs, no significant effect is observed, either. Table 6 presents the factors that affect initial returns. We find that the volatility of the firms has a significantly positive influence on initial returns. The natural logarithm of offering size is positive and significant. This suggests that the larger the offering size, the higher underwriting risk the underwriter may face. Consequently, shares will be underpriced more to attract investors. The coefficient for underwriter reputation is The coefficient of the UPREIT dummy is not significant.
. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the pattern of spreads and initial returns in the REIT IPOs from 1980 to 1999. First, we observe that the average equally weighted spread declines from 7.19% in the 1980s to 6.65% in the 1990s while average initial returns increase from -1.3% in the 1980s to 4.3% in the 1990s. Second, though the spreads received by the underwriters are mostly clustered at the levels of 6.5% and 7.0%, the level of clustering is not as obvious as found for medium size IPOs in Chen and Ritter (2000).
We attribute the dramatic changes both in spreads and initial returns to the change that took place in REIT institutions in the early 1990s. The internalization of management and advisory makes managers more active in operating the business and results in stronger valuation uncertainty. Underwriters manage to compensate for this risk by underpricing the IPOs. In addition, the active operations of REITs in the 1990s attracted more investments and led to a boom in REITs since then, which has resulted in fierce competition for underwriters when underwriting IPOs. Underwriters are forced to decrease their spreads because of competition. However, they can increase their underpricing to compensate for the loss in spreads. The reverse relationship between spreads and initial returns indicates that they are substitutes for each other.
We also show that the major factors affecting the spreads are the offering size while the factors affecting the initial returns are the valuation uncertainty and underwriter reputation. Table 1 . Number of the offerings, average spread, the initial return and total proceeds raised. The sample consists of 197 REITs initial public offerings. Value-weighted spread denotes value-weighted spread with proceeds being the weight. The calculation of the initial day return is the percentage price change from the offering price to the closing price of the first trading day. The amount of proceeds is expressed in terms of dollars of 1997 purchasing power, using the U.S. GDP price deflator. T-value investigates whether the initial day return is significantly different from zero. The samples are cataloged by advise, management and UPREITs (umbrella partnership REITs). EW mean denotes equally-weighted spread. VW mean denotes value-weighted spread with proceeds being the weight. The calculation of the initial day return is the percentage price change from the offering price to the closing price of the first trading day. The amount of proceeds is expressed in terms of dollars of 1997 purchasing power, using the U.S. GDP price deflator.T-value investigates whether the initial day return is significantly different from zero. Underwriters reputation rankings are based on a Carter and Manaster(1990) measurement that assigns a ranking of zero to nine for individual underwriters. To obtain the scores not among the " C-M rank ", we adopt the regression fitted by Hansen (2001): C-M rank = 0.997 + 0.806ln(1990's proceeds underwritten + 0.0979mean price). EW mean denotes equally-weighted spread. VW mean denotes value-weighted spread with proceeds being the weight. The calculation of the initial day return is the percentage price change from the offering price to the closing price of the first trading day. T-value investigates whether the initial day return is significantly different from zero. Table 6 , the spread clusters at 6.5% and 7.0%. The percentage of clustering is in parenthesis.
Table 5. The regression of gross spreads
The spread is computed by dividing the underwriter fees by the gross proceeds of the offering. Lnproceeds denotes natural logarithm of IPO proceeds to control "U-shaped" in offering size. Expense is the expense paid by the issuer, as a percentage of the total global amount offered. Reputation is underwriters reputation ranking based on Carter and Manaster(1990) measurement that assigns a ranking of zero to nine. REITindex is the standard deviation of NAREIT index monthly return over one year before IPO. Institutional is Ln ( 1 + % held by institutions ) from SNL database. Insider is Ln ( 1 + % insider holding ) from SNL database. Yeardummy: 0 represents REIT IPOs public from 1980 to 1991, 1 represents REIT IPOs public from 1992 to 1999. Managements: 0 is external-managed REITs, 1 is self-managed REITs. Adviser: 0 denotes external-advised REITs, 1 denotes internal-advised REITs. UPREIT: 0 means traditional partnership REIT, 1 means umbrella partnership REITs. P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6. The regression of the initial returns
The initial return is the raw return from SDC database and CRSP tape. Volatility is the stock return standard deviation over six months after 30 trading days past the offer date. Lnproceeds denotes natural logarithm of IPO proceeds to control "U-shaped" in offering size. Expense is the expense paid by the issuer, as a percentage of the total global amount offered. Reputation is underwriters reputation ranking based on Carter and Manaster(1990) measurement that assigns a ranking of zero to nine. REITindex is the standard deviation of NAREIT index monthly return over one year before IPO. Institutional is Ln ( 1 + % held by institutions ) from SNL database. Insider is Ln ( 1 + % insider holding ) from SNL database. Yeardummy: 0 represents REIT IPOs public from 1980 to 1991, 1 represents REIT IPOs public from 1992 to 1999. Managements: 0 is external-managed REITs, 1 is self-managed REITs. Adviser: 0 denotes external-advised REITs, 1 denotes internal-advised REITs. UPREIT: 0 means traditional partnership REIT, 1 means umbrella partnership REITs. P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
